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Abstract: Nigeria's subsidised mortgage system operates on the assumption that workers 
would subscribe to a scheme (National Housing Fund [NHF]) as a precondition for access to 
housing. The subsidised mortgages are limited in supply and the mechanism lacks efficiency 
and distributional equity. These issues are empirically examined in Jos. A survey was 
conducted among workers in 24 randomly selected organisations. A total of 543 
questionnaires were administered and 410 were retrieved. Analysis employing Pearson's chi 
square indicates a low-level of participation and a lack of awareness about the NHF 
scheme. There are negative feelings about the arrangement, and for the entire sample, 
gender and employment characteristics were found to have statistically significant 
relationships with participation in the NHF scheme. However, access to subsidised mortgage 
is influenced only by gender and tier of government employment. It is concluded that 
participation in the NHF scheme is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for access to 
mortgages in Jos. These findings call for increased awareness about NHF and improved 
efficiency in its administration. As the study was limited to the city of Jos, the methodology 
could be used to corroborate the evidence in other Nigerian cities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Access to affordable mortgage housing by low-income households has been an 
issue of concern in neoliberal Nigeria. This problem arises primarily because the 
Nigerian mortgage market is still developing, and the interplay of primary and 
secondary markets obtainable in advanced economies is lacking. As a result of 
this, the formal credit system in Nigerian cities, including Jos, is reaching a minute 
population. In the case of Jos, a recent study (Wapwera, Parsa and Egbu, 2011) 
that sampled 300 households confirmed that 75% of households have utilised 
informal credit sources over the last decade whereas only 25% have utilised formal 
sources. In Nigeria as a whole, the underdeveloped mortgage industry generated 
less than 100,000 transactions between 1960 and 2009. The sector's aggregate 
loans to total assets fell below 70% as recorded by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN). Mortgage to loan funds for the five years ending 2009 averaged at 14.51%, 
while the total mortgage market was put at N127.5 billion (USD 850 million) (EFInA 
and FinMark Trust, 2010). The contribution of mortgage financing to Nigeria's Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) was 0.39% in 2012 (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance 
in Africa, 2012: 109).  
Consequent to these issues, there are limited sources of medium- to long-
term finance for housing in Nigeria. This is exacerbated by the absence of a 
mortgage securitisation law. The absence of this law is limiting the ability of 
mortgage supplying institutions (which include primary mortgage institutions [PMIs], 
saving banks, insurance companies, pension fund custodians and housing 
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cooperatives) and the subsidised mortgage sector (the Federal Mortgage Bank of 
Nigeria, FMBN) to tap into long-term funding from the capital market in order to 
finance long-term loans. Also corroborating this evidence, the EFInA and FinMark 
(2010: 33) found that private mortgage institutions were advancing mortgages at 
a maximum tenure of 10 years as a result of dearth of long-term funds. This tenure 
is incompatible with housing mortgages, which require long-term financing. 
Furthermore, property rights are weak and at the time of this study, there was no 
clearly stated mortgage foreclosure law in Nigeria.  
Amidst these circumstances, the Federal Government of Nigeria thought 
that a state-run subsidy arrangement (through FMBN) would cater for the needs of 
low-income households. Nigeria's subsidy policy came into operation by the 
provision of the National Housing Fund Act of 1992 and the Federal Mortgage Act 
of 1993. These laws created a provident scheme known as the National Housing 
Fund (NHF), and FMBN was given the mandate to administer it. The NHF act 
requires people who are gainfully employed and receiving a monthly income to 
save 2.5% of their basic monthly income in the FMBN as a precondition for access 
to a loan. In this sense, the subscribers become key actors and partners in the 
supply of finance and housing that benefits them (Federal Government of Nigeria 
[FGN], 2006a; FGN, 1992). The FMBN is completely owned by the state, with its 
ownership structure comprised of the Federal Government, which has a 50% 
capital share, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), which has 30% and the Nigerian 
Social Insurance Trust Fund, which has 20% (FGN, 2011). For the purpose of ensuring 
that the FMBN has sufficient resources for its operation, the NHF and FMBN acts 
and the national housing policy of 1991 directed the FMBN to mobilise NHF 
subscriptions from workers across Nigeria. The FMBN was also directed to mobilise 
investible funds from commercial banks, insurance companies and foreign 
investors to create a pool of finance that is referred to as the National Housing 
Trust Fund (NHTF) (FGN, 2006a: 22). The NHTF is described as a subsidised sector 
because it supplies loans to NHF subscribers at a rate of 6% for 25–30 years. The 
arrangement for subsidising housing through the FMBN is further illustrated in           
Figure 1. 
The NHF arrangement is experiencing a number of challenges: firstly, the 
scheme is suffering from limited financial resources. This problem apparently results 
from the low participation in the NHF scheme. For instance, the FMBN, an agency 
responsible for administering the NHF, confirmed to the public that only N 106 
billion (equivalent to USD 642.3 million) was mobilised from its inception in 1992 to 
2013. Moreover, as of March 2013, there were only 3,772,031 contributors out of the 
35 million workers employed in public organisations across Nigeria (Ogunwusi, 
2013b). On this basis, it can be inferred that only 10.7% of public sector employees 
have subscribed to the scheme. A considerable population of prospective home 
owners employed in the informal and formal private sectors have not yet 
subscribed to the scheme (Ogunwusi, 2013a). Furthermore, the managers of the 
FMBN have confirmed to the public via print media that workers from only 28 
states (including the federal capital territory) out of the 37 states of the federation 
have subscribed to the scheme (Business Day Magazine, 2014). 
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Figure 1. Nigeria's Subsidised Housing Finance Model 
 
Secondly, the opportunity for access to mortgages by subscribers is 
limited. For example, only about N 100 billion (equivalent of USD 606.0 million) has 
been disbursed to 73,676 eligible contributors/beneficiaries from inception in 1992 
to 2013 (Ogunwusi, 2013b). In a mathematical sense, 73,676 in relation to all the 
subscribers (3,772,031) is just 1.9%. It is clear then that less than 2% of those 
subscribed to the scheme have gained access to a mortgage. Lastly, the 
administrators of the NHF scheme have lamented over public misconceptions 
regarding the scheme. Some workers assume that the scheme is the same as the 
defunct National Housing Programme (NHP), which failed to achieve its purpose in 
the 1980s. Others feel the FMBN, which is responsible for its administration, is the 
same as the liquidated federal government's primary mortgage institution (Federal 
Mortgage Finance Limited [FMFL]). Furthermore, some workers are of the view that 
the NHF scheme itself is a scam (FGN, 2013). These issues among others are the 
motivation for this study.  
In order to examine the issues affecting this arrangement for subsidising 
housing in Nigeria, it is necessary first of all to underscore that subsidies are meant 
to improve public health, justice, fairness and market efficiency (Chiquier and Lea, 
2009: 248). It is in line with these broad goals that subsidies are most frequently 
evaluated against four criteria: distributional issues and fairness, public accounting 
principles of transparency, the economic criteria of efficiency at the micro- and 
macro-levels, and the market effects of subsidies (Hoek-Smit, 2008: 10). This paper 
is concerned with issues of distribution and fairness, which will be examined in the 
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context of participation and access. Focusing on the workers that the subsidy 
scheme was designed to benefit in Jos (see the description of Jos city in Table 1), 
the following objectives are pursued: Given that the subsidy scheme in Nigeria is 
tied to peoples' employment, it is important to examine how employment 
characteristics (such as tier of government employment, length of employment, 
grade level attained at work place, satisfaction with salary income and gender 
attributes) influence workers' participation in the NHF scheme. Secondly, the 
subsidised housing arrangement operates on the assumption that the participation 
of workers in the NHF scheme would guarantee them access to mortgages. The 
second objective is to confirm if participation in the NHF scheme indeed 
guarantees access to mortgage housing in Jos. The last objective will examine the 
perceptions of workers about housing finance policy. Prior to addressing these 
objectives, the next section will compare and contrast the subsidy scheme in 
Nigeria to what obtains in other developing countries.  
 
Table 1. A Brief Description of the Jos City 
 
Features Remark 
Geography 
and 
climate 
Jos, the capital of Plateau State is located in central Nigeria; it is about four 
hours away from the federal capital territory (Abuja) by road;  the city lies on 
latitude 09°52'N and longitude 008°54'E; the average daily mean temperature 
of the city is 22.78oC; the landform in and around the city is undulating with 
rock outcrops; and it is connected to other cities of Nigeria by air, rail and 
road (Climate-Chart.com, 2010; Dung-Gwom and Rikko, 2009). 
Population The population of Greater Jos area in 2007 was 1,315,301; and at 5% growth 
rate, it is projected that the population of the city would have doubled to 2.7 
million by 2025 (Government of Plateau State, 2009). 
Housing 
situation 
Residential housing is provided through formal and informal arrangements; 
however, the informal solutions are dominant over the formal (Wapwera, 
Parsa and Egbu, 2011; Government of Plateau State, 2009).   
In 2009, official records (Government of Plateau State, 2009) documents that 
about 42% of houses were considered of "good" quality. These are houses with 
built-in toilet, running tap water and electricity supply. During the period, 
houses of "average" (shared facilities) quality were 48% and 10% were 
adjudged "bad" (lacking in-house or shared facilities).  
Some residential areas have developed into slums (24 settlements as 
documented by Dung-Gwom, 2007: 6); and as a result, the government has 
started implementing an urban renewal programme in the city (Ahovi, 2013).  
Housing 
need and 
projection 
As the population of Jos city is expected to double from 1.4 million to 2.7 
million in 2025, government authorities have projected (on an average 
household size of six persons) an additional 237,379 households within the city 
(Government of Plateau State, 2009); and accordingly, the government has 
launched the construction of 3000 housing units (News Agency of Nigeria, 
2014). 
Socio-
political 
During the last 10 years, the city of Jos has witnessed increased instability due 
to violent attacks by religious extremists known as the Boko Haram (western 
education is a sacrilege). This is now affecting the overall development of the 
city, including housing investment and choice of residential location (Aliyu, 
Kasim and Martin, 2011; Dung-Gwom and Rikko, 2009). 
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SUBSIDY PROVISION: THE EXPERIENCE OF NIGERIA AND OTHER DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 
This section attempts to contrast the housing financing practice in Nigeria to that 
of other developing countries to draw lessons for improvement. A comparison of 
this nature should help to establish the relevance of the study to the housing 
industry in Nigeria. A recent study (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, 
2010; 2012) suggests a commonality in housing financing challenges among 
African countries. In Nigeria's case, however, the concerns arise first because the 
country has a considerable population of poor people. In 2012, the population of 
Nigeria was estimated at 162 million people, and 84.59% of this population was 
earning below USD 60 per month. The level of poverty in Nigeria is so high that 
approximately 54.7% of the country's population live on less than USD 2 per day. 
With this level of poverty, the majority of households are unable to acquire and 
pay off the cost of a mortgage at the open market price. In 2012, for example, the 
cost of a 72 m2 house in Lagos was USD 31,250 and that of a 65 m2 house outside 
of Lagos was USD 15,000. This high price automatically deprives poor households 
access to decent housing (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, 2012: 
15, 109). This situation appears to be similar across other African countries as 
confirmed by the World Bank, which documents that only about three percent of 
the population have sufficient income for a mortgage. In a general sense, the cost 
of mortgage is high and above the affordability of low income households in most 
African countries. In 2012, for example, the cost of a newly constructed 65.7 m2 
apartment was USD 32,155 in Algeria; a 220 m2 apartment in the Gambia was USD 
100,000; an 80 m2 house in Angola was USD 60,000; a 58 m2 house in Botswana was 
USD 57,575; a 28.01 m2 house in Burkina Faso was USD 18,375; a 100 m2 apartment 
in Addis Ababa was USD 51,033; a 75 m2 house in Ghana was USD 17,500; and in 
Kenya, a 27 m2 house was USD 22,350. For these countries, more than two-thirds of 
the population are unable to afford the cost of such houses (Centre for Affordable 
Housing Finance in Africa, 2012). 
It is in view of the above that housing finance subsidies become crucial. 
However, the Nigerian experience of subsidising housing through the FMBN falls 
short of expectations. Firstly, a subsidy arrangement should be designed to 
alleviate funding constraints, but this appears not to be the case in Nigeria. 
Alleviating funding constraints essentially requires government to put in place a 
mechanism that enables mortgage lending institutions to have sufficient 
connections to capital markets to increase funding options and manage the risks 
related to long-term lending (Chiquier and Lea, 2009: 434). Some successful 
examples of subsidy programmes that are designed to alleviate funding 
constraints in emerging market economies include: the Cagamas of Malaysia, the 
Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal in Mexico, and the Mortgage Refinance Company 
in Egypt. These subsidy schemes have achieved success because the government 
provided a legal framework that enables the mortgage institutions to connect with 
the capital market. Additionally, for these countries, equity investments and/or 
guarantees from government or external sources are used to enhance the 
respective standing of mortgage institutions in the market place (Hoek-Smit, 2008 
cites Diamond and Hoek-Smit, 2000). Not much has been done about secondary 
market development even though an efficient secondary mortgage process is 
lacking in Nigeria. This is putting an enormous burden on the FMBN and PMIs to 
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carry the mortgage loans to maturity. It has been observed that: "outstanding 
mortgage loans remain on the books of mortgage providers no matter the tenure 
and this limits the ability of the FMBN and PMIs to originate more loans" (EFInA and 
FinMark Trust, 2010: 38). The Federal Government of Nigeria aspires to link primary 
and secondary mortgage markets to capital markets, but the absence of 
securitisation law is impeding this aspiration. At the time of this study, the sale of 
securitised mortgage debts by the FMBN and PMIs cannot be effectively achieved 
in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, Nigeria's subsidy arrangement lacks the potential to address 
mortgage credit risk. For a subsidy arrangement to have such potential, the 
government will need to partner with the private sector to improve the regulations, 
institutions, and information infrastructure that affect the working of a mortgage. In 
specific terms, the government should be able to improve on appropriate 
standards, property registration systems, cadastres, credit information systems, 
credit bureaus, foreclosure methods, usury laws, and underwriting and servicing 
methods (Chiquier and Lea, 2009: 436). Little attention is given to these in Nigeria, 
and specifically, credit risk has been a major deterrent for the expansion of 
national and local mortgage markets. This is so because there is a lack of credit 
and property market information, an adequate foreclosure system, and a good 
mechanism for dealing with credit risk. Countries that have made successful 
subsidy interventions to control credit risk are seen to give priority to the provision 
of incentives for the establishment of a credit information system or credit bureau. 
Lithuania is one country that has been successful in this. Some countries have 
been able to subsidise credit insurance. For example, the republic of Thailand 
provides this type of subsidy through the Government Housing Bank. A similar 
arrangement termed The FOGARIM Guarantee Programme exists in Morocco 
(Hoek-Smit, 2008). 
In Nigeria, the absence of clearly stated foreclosure laws is causing 
mortgage providers to adopt arbitrary measures to safe-guard their investment, to 
the detriment of borrowers. The World Bank (2009) confirms this and reports that 
short-term loans are provided and the maturity mismatch is largely mitigated by 
use of adjustable rate mortgages where loans rates are typically being tied to 
banks' prime lending rates. For instance, the average lending rate in the mortgage 
industry was 19.5% in 2011 (CBN Economic Report, 2011: 18). This is due to the 
absence of an adequate underwriting mechanism for examining the financial 
history of the borrower, particularly with respect to his/her record of repaying other 
loans (World Bank, 2009). The annual report of Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (2010: 
68) corroborates this evidence. In the CBN report, an analysis of the maturity 
structure of loans and advances made by saving banks at the end of December 
2010 indicates that short-term loan maturity remains dominant in the credit market. 
Outstanding loans and advances maturing in one year or less accounted for 
65.3%, whereas medium-term (one to three years) and long-term (three years and 
above) accounted for 14.6% and 20.1%, respectively. Saving banks are the key 
players in the open market mortgage sector, but their credit supply is primarily on 
a short-term basis. Nigeria can learn from the experience of Lithuania and Thailand 
to improve on its housing subsidy system. The Moroccan FOGARIM subsidy 
arrangement is designed to address employment and earning uncertainties. This 
subsidy caters to self-employed or informally employed borrowers who carry a 
higher credit risk (Hoek-Smit, 2008).  
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Nigeria's subsidised mortgage arrangement allows workers employed in 
formal and informal sectors to subscribe to the NHF scheme, but there is no 
arrangement for mitigating employment and earning uncertainties as they have in 
Morocco. Thus, Nigeria could learn from the practice in Morocco. Further, there 
are supply and access issues around the subsidy arrangement in Nigeria: the first 
issue is connected to the shortage of finance and a limited supply of housing for 
the benefit of NHF subscribers. Specifically, the official records published by FMBN 
in local print media in 2012 indicate that there were 3,647,275 subscribers to the 
NHF scheme with less than 10% having access to mortgages (Ogunwusi, 2013b). 
For instance, the cumulative amount of money disbursed for the benefit of NHF 
subscribers as of November 2011 was USD 392,831,100.13. This amount is composed 
of Estate Development Loans (USD 279,475,718.28) and NHF mortgage loans 
provided through PMIs (USD 201,605,381.85). This money was used in financing the 
construction of 32,831 housing units, and part of it was used to advance mortgage 
loans to 18,431 NHF subscribers. This was in addition to 9,575 housing units financed 
through a Mortgage-Backed Bond issued in 2007. In quantitative terms, only 
approximately 60,837 housing units have been provided through NHF (Ogunwusi, 
2012). On a general note, the supply of subsidised mortgages is insignificant when 
compared to Nigeria's housing deficit estimate of 12–17 million units (Ashkin, 2013: 
1; Pepple, 2012: 13). The supply of subsidised housing in Nigeria is also not 
impressive when compared with emerging economies. For example, the 
government-run mortgage lender (Infonavit) in Mexico gave out 578,396 
mortgages worth around USD 12.6 billion in 2012. This was 16% over its performance 
in 2011 (Guthrie, 2013). In South Africa, the post-apartheid administration started a 
housing scheme for middle-to-low income groups termed The Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) in 1994. The performance of this programme was 
impressive, and between 1994 and 2008 approximately two million subsidised 
houses were provided (Gordon, Bertoldi and Nell, 2011: 28). Nigeria can learn from 
the experience of these countries to improve on the mechanics for supplying 
subsidised housing.  
The second issue arises from the uneven distribution of subsidised 
mortgage houses across Nigeria. For example, the houses provided by private 
house-builders and housing corporations with Estate Development Loans 
approved by the FMBN were allocated to 12 out of 37 states (the Federal Capital 
Territory [FCT] inclusive). Jos, the capital of Plateau State, was a beneficiary of this 
(Salami, 2009: 16–20). Similarly, the NHF loans were made to subscribers in 16 of 37 
states (FCT inclusive), and the evidence available suggests that the city of Jos did 
not benefit from this (FGN, 2006b: 23–25). The distribution process is a potential 
hindrance to equitable access. This concern is deserving attention by the 
administrators of the subsidy scheme in Nigeria.  
The third issue is the inability to make the initial down payment required 
prior to taking possession of a mortgage. This problem is not peculiar to Nigeria. 
Hoek-Smit (2008) reports that the main hurdle for expanding homeownership in 
developing countries is for households to save enough money to pay for the down 
payment, title closing costs and/or an upfront premium for mortgage insurance. 
The republic of Chile provides a form of subsidy to address this concern. In the 
Chilean experience, an upfront grant subsidy is provided (by the state bank: 
Banco del Estado) on behalf of a low-income household that intends to take up a 
mortgage. The government of Chile ensures that 20% of all eligible mortgage 
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applicants are selected for this subsidy. However, low-income households usually 
receive the largest grants. Additionally, the more needy households and those 
who had saved more are given priority. This type of arrangement is lacking in 
Nigeria, and it is worth borrowing. 
The last issue with the Nigerian subsidy arrangement is the absence of 
multiple subsidy options. For example, the South African subsidy arrangement is 
designed with multiple options that cater to different categories of people. 
Specifically, the following subsidies options exist in South Africa: consolidation 
subsidies; individual subsidies; an integrated residential development programme; 
institutional subsidies; a discount benefit scheme; rural subsidies; subsidies for 
people with disabilities; people's housing process; farm resident subsidies; and a 
finance-linked subsidy programme. These subsidies are administered by multiple 
organisations such as the Department for Human Settlement, the Housing 
Development Agency, the National Housing Finance Corporation, the National 
Urban Reconstruction and Housing Agency, the Rural Housing Loan Fund, and the 
Social Housing Regulatory Authority. The pluralist approach adopted in South 
Africa promotes equity and access (Nierkerk, 2011). 
 
 
METHODS AND APPROACH 
 
This study employs a questionnaire for the collection of data. The questionnaire 
was designed in two parts, both of which centred on the research objectives. In 
the first part, closed questions were designed for respondents to tick a range of 
options. In the second part, respondents were allowed to freely express their 
feelings about the NHF arrangement. The questionnaire method was used 
because it offers the advantage of collecting a large amount of information from 
a large sample in a short period of time in a relatively cost-effective way. The study 
population consisted of public sector workers employed by Federal, State and 
Local Government establishments in the city of Jos. The reason for choosing public 
sector workers is because the NHF scheme is worker-focused, and civil servants 
were first given the opportunity to subscribe to it.  
At the time of data collection, there were 82 Federal Government 
establishments, 54 State Government establishments and 18 Local Government 
Departments in the study area. The units of analysis in this research are individuals 
employed by these establishments and not the establishments themselves. 
Therefore, the aggregate of establishments formed the elements from which the 
sample population (individuals) was selected. The research employed a multi-
stage sampling technique in order to arrive at a suitable sample for the study. The 
choice of this sampling technique was with a view to overcoming the difficulty of 
getting access to staff lists for all public establishments in Jos. The multi-stage logic 
adopted in order to arrive at a sample population is as follows: firstly, lists of 
organisations that fell under the control of each tier of government (Federal, State 
and Local) in Jos were compiled into three clusters. The second stage involved 
stratifying organisations in each cluster into strata of allied professions and related 
functions. From each stratum, organisations were randomly selected and letters 
were sent to them requesting permission to conduct the survey. From the Federal 
Government cluster, seven organisations gave approval, nine from the State 
Government cluster and eight Council Departments from the Jos North and South 
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Local Government cluster. The procedure followed is consistent with the logic 
recommended by Babbie (2007).  
The survey covered only organisations where authorities gave permission 
for workers to participate. Questionnaires were sent out to workers through their 
staff officers and later retrieved from them. In all, a total of 543 questionnaires were 
administered and 410 were retrieved. Five out of the 410 questionnaires retrieved 
were invalid due to incomplete responses. The survey ended up with 405 valid 
questionnaires, which represent a percentage return of 74.58, and this forms the 
basis of the analysis. The adequacy of the sample size was determined based on 
the population in Jos and with inferences from previous studies. The exact 
population of public sector workers in the city of Jos is not known, but the human 
population in the city of Jos was estimated at 736,016 in 2006 (Government of 
Plateau State, 2008: 15). Israel (2010) stated that at five-percent precision levels, a 
sample size of 400 is an adequate representation of populations above 100,000. 
Similarly, Taylor (2012) says that, for an unknown target population, 300–500 
respondents can work as long as the survey is representative. In this case, there is a 
human population (736,016 people in 2006) estimate which serves as a clue, and 
in any case, the population of public sector workers in Jos can only be a fraction 
of the total estimate. Thus, a sample of 405 is considered an adequate 
representation.  
The analysis proceeds to examine fairness in relation to the subsidy 
arrangement in Jos. This was achieved by analysing the responses collected in the 
questionnaire survey. The questions asked in the survey were aimed at collecting 
information on certain attributes (such as tier of government employment, length 
of employment, grade level attained at work place, level of satisfaction with 
income and gender characteristics) that can potentially facilitate or restrain one's 
ability to subscribe to the NHF scheme and benefit therefrom. The attributes of 
workers were used as the parameters for evaluation; accordingly, the first 
parameter is the tier of government employment of the respondent. On this basis, 
participation in the NHF scheme and access to mortgage housing for workers 
employed by Federal, State and Local Government organisations is examined. The 
second parameter used for evaluation is the length of employment, and on this 
basis, participation and access for workers that have been employed for 14 years 
or less, those employed for 15–28 years and those that have worked for 29 years or 
more were analysed. The third parameter is based on the staffing structure 
obtainable in the Nigerian civil service. The staffing structure runs from Grade Level 
01–17 (see Adedeji and Olotuah, 2012: 83 for example) in most public 
organisations, and this has been employed as a measure for determining one's 
ability to pay off owner-occupied housing (Lewis, 1977: 66, 67); it has also been 
used to gauge one's financial capacity to access credit for housing (Adedeji and 
Olotuah, 2012: 82). In this study, the staffing structure is used to evaluate access to 
housing. Thus, access is evaluated for low cadre workers (GL 01–06), medium 
cadre workers (GL 07–12) and high cadre workers (GL 13–17). The fourth 
parameter is based on respondents' feelings about their salary income. In regard 
to this, participation and access to subsidised mortgages is analysed based on 
those who feel bad about their income, those who feel neither bad nor good, and 
those who feel good. Lastly, participation and access to subsidised mortgages is 
examined on the basis of respondents' gender: male or female.  
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The variables (attributes of respondents) under study are nominal 
/categorical in nature. The variables were statically scrutinised to find out whether 
they have any relationship with participation and access to the NHF mortgages. 
Pearson's Chi-square and Cramer's statistics were utilised in this analysis for the 
reason that they are the most appropriate for testing the relationship between 
categorical (nominal and ordinal) variables (Babbie, 1988; Friendly, 2003). Pallant 
(2011) concurs with Babbie and Friendly in confirming that Pearson's Chi-square 
and Cramer's statistics can efficiently determine whether a statistically significant 
relationship exists between two categorical variables.  
The analysis follows this order: firstly, descriptive statistical tools were 
employed to examine the opportunity for subscribing to the NHF scheme and 
access a mortgage. At this level of analysis, a comparison was made between the 
categories that fall within each parameter. The next level of analysis determines 
the relationship and association that each explanatory parameter (tier of 
government employed, length of employment, Grade Level, feeling about 
income and sex) has with participation in the NHF scheme and access to 
mortgage housing. For this purpose, Pearson's Chi-square and Cramer's statistics 
were employed; p-values and Cramer's V were reported. Pearson's Chi-square 
statistic determines whether two variables are independent; if the significance 
value is small enough (less than 0.05), then a statistical relationship is said to exist 
between the variables under consideration. Cramer's V statistic takes values from 
a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1; the closer the statistic is to 1, the stronger the 
association between the variables (Field, 2009). 
 
 
PARTICIPATION IN THE NHF SCHEME AND ACCESS TO SUBSIDISED MORTGAGE 
HOUSING IN JOS 
 
Description of Respondents on the Basis of Evaluation Parameters 
 
The analysis is based on 405 valid questionnaires, and the sample population 
consists of 270 male subjects (representing 67.2%) and 132 females (who represent 
32.8%). The distribution of subjects according to tier of government employment 
indicates that 35.6% (144 subjects) were employed in Federal Government 
organisations; 38.5% (156 subjects) were employed in State Government 
organisations and 25.9% (105 respondents) were employed in Local Government 
Council departments. From the sample population, 51.5% (208 subjects) have 
worked for 14 years or less; 35.6% (144 subjects) have been in a public sector job in 
the range of 15–28 years while 12.9% (52 subjects) have worked for 29 years or 
more. The subjects consist of 17.6% (70 subjects) low cadre workers within Grade 
Levels 01–06; 60.1% (239 subjects) middle cadre workers within Grade Levels 07–12 
and 22.4% (89 subjects) high cadre workers. Regarding their incomes, 55.0% (222 
subjects) feel "good" about their income; 14.9% (60 subjects) said their income was 
"neither good nor bad"; 30.2% (122 subjects) felt their income was "bad". These 
variables summarise the attributes of the workers being examined. 
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Assessing the Level of Participation of Workers in the NHF Scheme 
 
The question that followed after respondents provided their personal information 
was a probe to confirm the level of participation in the NHF scheme. From the 
sampled population, 43.3% (175 subjects) said they were participating in NHF while 
56.7% (230 subjects) said they were not. This level of participation is low, and a 
search for reasons why some workers were not subscribed to the scheme suggests 
the following. Out of the 230 subjects that were not subscribing, 45.6% (104 
respondents) were unaware of the existence of the NHF scheme; 17.9% (40 
subjects) did not wish to participate and 35.4% (79 subjects) gave other reasons: 
"my employer refused to let us participate"; "my place of work is not captured on 
the NHF scheme"; "the NHF scheme is dead"; "the NHF does not operate"; and "the 
labour union stopped us from participating in the NHF". These responses appeared 
in several completed questionnaires, cutting across workers employed in Federal 
and State Government agencies. The workers employed in the Local Government 
Council departments wrote in several completed questionnaires that: "there is no 
NHF provision for the Local Government Council workers". On the basis of this 
analysis, it is concluded that the primary factor that accounts for the low 
participation of workers in the NHF scheme is their lack of awareness about the 
housing finance policy. The views of respondents indicate that public sector 
employers and labour unions do have an influence on the participation of workers. 
Additionally, the NHF scheme does not operate in all the public organisations in 
Jos, and there is an indication that Local Government employees have less 
opportunity to participate in the scheme. Further analysis will examine why this is so 
in Jos. 
 
The Influence of Tier of Government Employment on Participation and Access 
 
The fairness of the subsidised mortgage scheme is examined in relation to tier of 
government employment of the respondents. There were 404 valid cases (subjects 
who responded to this) and the analysis indicates that: participation is high among 
Federal Government workers (88 respondents; 50.3%) compared to those 
employed by State Government (82 respondents; 46.9%) and Local Government 
(five respondents; 2.9%) organisations (see Table 2). As clearly seen, the Federal 
Government workers have more opportunity to participate in the NHF scheme 
than State Government workers, who in turn have more opportunity to participate 
than Local Government workers. Employees of Local Government Councils are 
the least favoured by the subscription housing finance arrangement. This 
corroborates the comments written by Local Government Councils workers who 
repeatedly indicated that the NHF scheme does not operate at their level. The test 
of statistical significance also validates this finding: tier of government employment 
of public sector workers in Jos was found to influence participation in the NHF 
scheme. Based on the results presented in Table 2, the Pearson Chi-square value 
obtained is less than impossible (Chi-square = 86.816; p = 0.00) and the Cramer's 
statistic (V = 0.464) indicates a strong association. 
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Table 2. Relationship between the Tiers of Government Employed with 
Participation in NHF Scheme and Access to Subsidised Mortgage in Jos 
 
Tier of Government 
Employed 
Participation in NHF 
Scheme 
Accessed/Plan to Access NHF 
Mortgage 
Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) No (%) 
Federal Government 
organisation 
88 (50.3) 56 (24.5) 09 (64.3) 122 (36.4) 
State Government 
organisation 
82 (46.9) 74 (32.3) 05 (35.7) 130 (38.8) 
Local Government 
Council department 
05 (02.9) 99 (43.2) 00 (00.0) 80 (24.8) 
Total 175 (100) 229 (100) 14 (100) 332 (100) 
Relationship and 
association of 
variables 
Relationship between tier 
of government employed 
and participation in NHF 
scheme (Chi-square = 
86.816, p = 0.00;                     
V = 0.464) 
Relationship between tier of 
government employed and 
access to mortgage (Chi-
square = 6.282, p = 0.04;                 
V = 0.134) 
 
Access to NHF mortgages is examined in relation to tier of government 
employed, and for this analysis, 59 cases were missing and 346 were valid. The 
results indicate that only 14 subjects have accessed or plan to access an NHF 
mortgage (see Table 2). Out of the 14 subjects, more than half (nine respondents; 
64.3%) were employees of Federal Government organisations, five (35.7%) were 
employed in State Government organisations and none was employed in an LGC 
department. A Chi-square value of 6.282 (p = 0.04) and Cramer's statistic of V = 
0.134 were obtained from the tests of relationship and association. On the basis of 
this finding, it is concluded that the subsidised housing scheme is not equitable to 
workers on the basis of tier of government employment. Federal Government 
employees appear to derive higher benefits from the NHF scheme over those 
employed in Local and State Government organisations. Additionally, those 
employed in LGC are the most deprived.  
 
Effect of Length of Employment on Participation and Access 
 
The purpose of this analysis is to find out if length of employment gives undue 
advantage for participation in the NHF scheme and access to mortgage housing 
in Jos. Three respondents did not respond to the question, which leaves 403 valid 
cases for the analysis. The examination of participation in the NHF scheme (Table 
3) indicates that: 43.1% (75 respondents) of subscribers have worked for 14 years or 
less; 40.8% (71 respondents) have worked between 15 and 28 years; and a small 
fraction of 16.1% (28 respondents) have worked for 29 years or more. The test of 
relationship (Chi-square of 8.687, p = 0.013; Cramer's statistics of V = 0.147) is 
statistically significant, indicating the presence of a relationship and an association 
between the length of employment and participation in the NHF scheme.  
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Table 3. Relationship of Length of Employment with Participation in NHF Scheme 
and Access to Subsidised Mortgages 
 
Length of Employment 
Participation in NHF 
Scheme 
Accessed/Plan to Access NHF 
Mortgage 
Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) No (%) 
Less or equal 14 years 75 (43.1) 132 (57.6) 07 (50.0) 167 (50.0) 
15 to 28 years 71 (40.8) 73 (31.9) 06 (42.9) 121 (36.2) 
29 years and above 28 (16.1) 24 (10.5) 01 (7.1) 46 (13.8) 
Total 174 (100) 229 (100) 14 (100) 334 (100) 
Relationship and 
association between 
variables 
Relationship between 
length of employment 
and participation in NHF 
scheme (Chi-square = 
8.687, p = 0.01; V = 0.147) 
Relationship between length of 
employment and access to 
mortgage (Chi-square = 0.599,           
p = 0.74; V = 0.041) 
 
In regard to those that have accessed or plan to access an NHF 
mortgage, the results (Table 3) are consistent with the participation: there were 
348 valid cases out of 405; only 14 respondents confirmed to have accessed or 
plan to access an NHF mortgage, and 50.0% (seven respondents) are those that 
have worked for 14 years or less; 42.9 (six respondents) have been employed in the 
range of 15 and 28 years; and only one respondent, representing 7.1%, is among 
those that have worked for 29 years or more. However, there is no statistically 
significant relationship (p = 0.74) between length of employment and access to 
NHF mortgage in Jos. The association between these variables is also weak as 
confirmed by Cramer's statistic (V = 0.041). On the basis of this finding, it is 
concluded that a longer period of employment does give undue advantage for 
participation in the NHF scheme, and such advantage is not confirmed for access 
to a mortgage in Jos.  
 
The Influence of Position Attained (By Grade Level) at Work Place 
 
The opportunity for participation in the NHF scheme and access to mortgages on 
the basis of position attained at the work place is examined in this section. Eight 
respondents did not respond to the question and are treated as missing. As 
illustrated in Table 4, only 173 workers out of 397 were subscribed to the NHF 
scheme, and the response rate for subjects who reported that they were 
subscribed to the NHF scheme is 12.1% (21 respondents) among low cadre 
workers; it rises to 63.0% (109 respondents) in the middle cadre and decreases to 
24.9% among the high cadre. This suggests that as subjects attain higher positions 
in a public sector job, they tend to gain more opportunity to subscribe to the NHF 
scheme, but middle level cadre subjects have the highest rate of subscription. The 
position attained at the work place (by Grade Level) was found to have a 
statistically significant relationship with participation in the NHF scheme (p = 0.04), 
and Cramer's statistic (V = 0.124) also suggests the presence of an association 
between position attained at the work place and participation in the NHF 
scheme. 
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Table 4. Relationship of Position Attained at Work Place with Participation in NHF 
and Access to Subsidised Mortgages 
 
Position Attained at Work 
Place 
Participation in NHF Scheme Accessed/Plan to Access NHF Mortgage 
Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) No (%) 
Low cadre (Grade Level 01–
06) 
21 (21.1) 48 (21.4) 03 (21.4) 57 (16.6) 
Middle cadre (Grade Level 
07–12) 
109 (63.0) 130 (58.0) 07 (50.0) 206 (60.1) 
High cadre (Grade Level 
13–17) 
43 (24.9) 46 (20.5) 04 (28.6) 80 (23.3) 
Total 173 (100) 224 (100) 14 (100) 343 (100) 
Relationship and 
association of variables 
Relationship between Grade 
Level attained at work place 
and participation in NHF 
scheme (Chi-square = 6.060, 
p = 0.04; V = 0.124) 
Relationship between Grade 
Level attained at work place 
and access to mortgage 
(Chi-square = 0.621, p = 0.73; 
V = 0.043) 
 
The result obtained (Table 4) from evaluating the opportunity for access to 
mortgages is consistent with that of participation in the NHF scheme. With only 357 
valid cases and 14 workers who have accessed or plan to access an NHF 
mortgage, the analysis reveals that the rate of access to mortgages was 21.4% 
(three respondents) among the low cadre subjects; 50% (seven respondents) 
among the middle cadre; and 28.6% (four respondents) for high cadre workers. 
However, the test of statistical significance (p = 0.73; V = 0.043) indicates the 
absence of a relationship or association between position attained at the work 
place and access to an NHF mortgage. 
 
Gender, Participation in the NHF Scheme and Access to Subsidised Mortgages 
 
The fairness of the housing finance arrangement is examined in relation to gender. 
There were 401 valid cases and a higher number of male respondents as seen in 
previous analyses. In regard to participation in the NHF scheme (see Table 5), the 
majority were male subjects (73.8%) and only male subjects have had access or 
plan to access an NHF mortgage. A statistically significant relationship exists 
between respondents' gender and participation in NHF (p = 0.01; V = 0.125). There 
is also a statistically significant relationship between gender and access to NHF 
mortgages (p = 0.01; V = 0.132). All these are in favour of males as opposed to 
females. 
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Table 5. Relationship of Respondents' Sex with Participation and Access to NHF 
Mortgage 
 
Respondents' Sex 
Participation in NHF Scheme Accessed/Plan to Access NHF Mortgage 
Yes (%) No (%) Yes (%) No (%) 
Male 127 (73.8) 142 (62.0) 13 (100.0) 226 (67.9) 
Female 45 (26.2) 87 (38.0) 00 (00.00) 107 (32.1) 
Total 172 (100.0) 229 (100.0) 13 (100.0) 333 (100.0) 
Relationship and 
association of variables 
Relationship between 
respondents' sex and 
participation in NHF scheme 
(Chi-square = 6.224, p = 0.01; 
V = 0.125) 
Relationship between 
respondents' sex and access 
to mortgage (Chi-square = 
6.047, p = 0.01; V = 0.132) 
 
 
THE TARGETING OF SUBSIDIES 
 
The analysis conducted confirms that employment characteristics (tier of 
government employment, length of employment and position attained at the 
work place) and gender influence participation in NHF. However, only tier of 
government and gender were found to influence access to an NHF mortgage in 
Jos. On the basis of this finding it can be concluded that the NHF arrangement is 
not equitable. Beyond this, the Nigerian experience of subsidising housing through 
the FMBN and the NHF scheme falls short of some basic principles for targeting of 
subsidies. Subsidies should be designed to serve the interests of the public, and 
there should be a mechanism for monitoring its implementation to ensure 
compliance and effectiveness (World Bank, 2013). This principle is lacking in 
Nigeria as substantiated by the low level of awareness about the NHF housing 
finance scheme in Jos. The previous analysis revealed that 223 out of 405 
respondents were not subscribed to the NHF scheme. And almost half (104) of 
those who were not subscribed to the scheme confirmed that they were unaware 
of its existence. People have to be aware of the subsidy scheme in order to 
benefit from it, but this is not the case with the housing finance policy in Nigeria. 
The analysis conducted to examine the effect of tier of government on 
participation in the NHF scheme revealed a statistically significant relationship. This 
prompted a further probe into the relationship of tier of government employment 
and reasons for not participating in NHF scheme (see Table 5). As indicated in 
Table 6, about half (49.0%) of those who were not aware of the existence of the 
NHF scheme were employees of Local Government organisations. The lack of 
awareness was seen less (28.8%) and less (22.1%) frequently among those 
employed in State and Federal Government organisations, respectively. The 
subsidy arrangement is more accessible to the Federal and State Government 
employees even though they expressed a high rate of not wishing to participate 
(35.0% and 37.5%, respectively) compared to the Local Government employees 
(27.5%) (see Table 6).  
The World Bank (2013) provides that subsidies should be designed and 
administered based on "solid and rigorous information about what types of service 
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people want and are willing to help pay for, what they are willing to use, what is 
the affordability for the target group, and what can be scaled up in the long 
term". On the basis of lack of awareness, it can be concluded that this principle is 
grossly undermined by the Nigerian housing finance policy. 
 
Table 6. Reason for Not Participating in NHF on the Basis of Tier of Government 
Employed 
 
 Tier of Government 
Employed Total 
Federal State Local 
Reason Not 
Participating 
in NHF 
Not aware 
of its 
existence 
Count 23 30 51 104 
Percentage within 
reason not 
participating in NHF 
22.1 28.8 49.0 100.0 
Percentage within 
tier of government 
employed 
41.1 40.5 54.8 46.6 
Do not wish 
to 
participate 
Count 14 15 11 40 
Percentage within 
reason not 
participating in NHF 
35.0 37.5 27.5 100.0 
Percentage within 
tier of government 
employed 
25.0 20.3 11.8 17.9 
Other 
reasons 
Count 19 29 31 79 
Percentage within 
reason not 
participating in NHF 
24.1 36.7 39.2 100.0 
percentage within 
tier of government 
employed 
33.9 39.2 33.3 35.4 
Total Count 56 74 93 223 
Percentage within 
reason not 
participating in NHF 
25.1 33.2 41.7 100.0 
Percentage within 
tier of government 
employed 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
The principle of equity in relation to subsidy provision requires that 
government should encourage access for targeted segments (such as low-
income households) of society (World Bank, 2013). In Nigeria, the NHF scheme is 
meant to facilitate access for low-income households, and in Jos, this segment 
appears to be high among the Local Government workers compared to State 
and Federal Government workers. However, the housing finance scheme is 
evidently not being targeted at the Local Government segment. The findings 
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presented in Table 7 substantiate this claim: on the basis of satisfaction with 
income, there is a high response rate among the Federal Government (56.2%) 
employees compared to those employed in State (40.4%) and Local (3.6%) 
government organisations. In a similar manner, the level of participation in NHF is 
consistent with the level of satisfaction with income: 61.5% for Federal government; 
37.5% for State; and 1.0% for employees of Local Government Councils. As evident 
in Table 6, the Local Government employees are highly dissatisfied with their 
incomes compared to State and Federal Government employees. This finding 
suggests that the poorer households are among the Local Government 
employees, and therefore, a case can be made for the NHF subsidies to be 
targeted at them.  
 There is a feeling of fear and worry about the inconsistent nature of 
government policies in Nigeria. This concern was expressed by a respondent who 
said: "Government policies have been very unstable and I cannot trust the housing 
policy". Closely related to this is a concern of mistrust regarding the housing 
finance policy. One respondent observed that: "… when a worker subscribes to it, 
the money is eaten by corrupt officials". There is also a fear arising from the lack of 
transparency and accountability on the part of NHF administrators. This is raised in 
the following response: "The operators of the NHF scheme are not honest at all, 
after being on waiting list for a long period one's turn will never come". 
Furthermore, the arrangement for supplying mortgage housing to NHF subscribers 
is not appealing to the workers in Jos. As indicated earlier, the housing finance 
policy permits the FMBN to approve loans to developers on behalf of subscribers 
who have applied for a loan. Some respondents expressed concern over this: "… 
the NHF arrangement is good but the policy for release of funds to contributors 
only through estate developers is not fair because it does not allow one to build to 
his/her specification and taste". Another respondent said: "I would like to decide 
on the type of house to buy. With the NHF scheme it is not like that because 
developers build to their specifications and not to our taste" 
 The issues raised by workers are a potential setback to 
participation in the NHF scheme and access to subsidised mortgages. The workers 
in Jos are more inclined to use alternative sources of finance compared to the 
NHF mortgages. The subjects were asked to identify sources of finance they have 
used or plan to use in acquiring houses. For this question, 349 subjects responded 
out of 405, and the results presented in Figure 2 indicate that the use of personal 
savings is high at 49.9% (174 subjects) followed by those who combined different 
sources of finance at 18.3% (64 subjects) and those who use alternatives sources 
such as Cooperatives/Thrift (15.5% = 54 subjects). This finding suggests that the NHF 
scheme has limited significance when compared to alternative sources, and 
perhaps, that it is less reliable compared to the alternatives. 
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Table 7. Participation in NHF Scheme by Tier of Government Employed and 
Controlling for Level of Satisfaction with Income 
 
Level of Satisfaction with Income 
Tier of Government Employed 
Total Federal 
Government 
State 
Government 
Local 
Government 
Good Percentage 
currently 
participating 
in NHF 
Yes Count 59 36 1 96 
Percentage 
within 
currently 
participate 
in NHF 
61.5 37.5 1.0 100.0 
Percentage 
within tier of 
government 
employed 
56.2 40.4 3.6 43.2 
No Count 46 53 27 126 
Percentage 
within 
currently 
participate 
in NHF 
36.5 42.1 21.4 100.0 
Percentage 
within tier of 
government  
employed 
43.8 59.6 96.4 56.8 
Neither Percentage 
Currently 
Participating 
in NHF 
Yes Count 15 21 1 37 
Percentage 
within 
currently 
participate 
in NHF 
40.5 56.8 2.7 100.0 
Percentage 
within tier of 
government 
employed 
78.9 77.8 7.7 62.7 
No Count 4 6 12 22 
Percentage 
within 
currently 
participate 
in NHF 
18.2 27.3 54.5 100.0 
Percentage 
within tier of 
government 
employed 
21.1 22.2 92.3 37.3 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 7. (continued) 
 
Level of Satisfaction with Income 
Tier of Government Employed 
Total Federal 
Government 
State 
Government 
Local 
Government 
Bad Percentage 
currently 
participating 
in NHF 
Yes Count 14 24 3 41 
Percentage 
within 
currently 
participate 
in NHF 
34.1 58.5 7.3 100.0 
Percentage 
within tier of 
government 
employed 
70.0 61.5 4.8 33.6 
No Count 6 15 60 81 
Percentage 
within 
currently 
participate 
in NHF 
7.4 18.5 74.1 100.0 
Percentage 
within tier of 
government 
employed 
30.0 38.5 95.2 66.4 
Total   Count 144 155 104 403 
   Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.0 
 
 
Figure 2. Sources of Housing Finance Used by Workers in Jos 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study was conducted to identify the variables influencing access to subsidised 
mortgage housing in Jos, Nigeria. In achieving this goal, the practice of subsidising 
housing in Nigeria was examined in relation to the experience of selected 
emerging economies. On the basis of this comparison, the study concludes that 
the design of Nigeria's housing finance subsidy lacks the potential to alleviate 
funding constraints by the subsidy provision agency (the FMBN); it exposes the 
mortgage institutions (the FMBN and PMIs) to mortgage credit risk; and it provides 
less mitigation (to high risk mortgage takers) against employment and earnings 
uncertainties. Recommendations and suggestions in relation to these findings are 
provided in previous discussions.  
Furthermore, the study found that there is a limited supply of subsidised 
housing for the benefit of NHF subscribers; an uneven distribution of subsidised 
mortgage housing across Nigeria; the inability of low-income subscribers to make 
initial down payments required prior to taking possession of a mortgage; and the 
absence of multiple subsidy options. These issues account for the poor supply of 
mortgage housing in Jos, and they also constrain access to the small number of 
houses supplied for the benefit of NHF subscribers. It is recommended that 
government should give attention to these problems. The experience of other 
developing countries as outlined in the study can help Nigeria to effectively tackle 
these problems.  
The empirical study conducted identified a number of variables that 
influence workers' participation in the NHF scheme and access to subsidised 
mortgage housing in Jos. Firstly, there is a low level of participation in the NHF 
scheme in Jos, and one key factor that accounts for this is the lack of awareness 
about the housing finance policy. Secondly, participation in the NHF scheme on 
the basis of tier of government employment, length of employment, position 
attained at the work place and on the basis of gender is not equitable for the 
public sector workers in Jos. Thirdly, there is an acute shortage in the supply of 
subsidised housing in Jos, and access to the limited volume supplied is not 
equitable on the basis of gender and tier of government employment. Fourthly, 
the subsidy is not well targeted at the low-income segment, which is found to be 
high among Local Government employees. In addition, the workers in Jos are 
worried about the inconsistent nature of government policy, corruption among 
administrators of the subsidy scheme, lack of transparency and accountability, 
and the unappealing process of approving NHF loans to subscribers. These issues 
are partly responsible for the limited use of the NHF scheme compared to 
alternative financing solutions in Jos.  
Overall, the subsidised mortgage system can potentially extend 
homeownership opportunities to low-income households in Jos. However, there is a 
need for increased participation of workers in the NHF scheme, and the 
government also needs to improve the effectiveness of the NHF mortgage system. 
The findings suggest the necessity for FMBN to carry out sensitisation and 
awareness campaigns about the NHF scheme. This could lead to a change in the 
negative perception that workers hold about the scheme. The FMBN can also gain 
the trust and confidence of the public through this process. In addition, there is a 
need to set ethical standards around the subsidised mortgage system. This will 
improve the transparency of the FMBN and its affiliated PMIs and developers. The 
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roles of employers and labour unions are critical to the success of the NHF scheme. 
Therefore, it would be helpful for the government to put in place a mechanism for 
collaboration between the FMBN, the labour union and the employers. This may 
help to influence employers to allow their employees to participate in the NHF 
scheme. The lack of fairness resulting from gender and employment 
characteristics needs to be addressed by making participation in the NHF scheme 
equitable for all workers. Lastly, there is a need for oversight of the housing 
allocation mechanism to checkmate any tendency toward favouritism.  
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